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ABSTRACT 
 
In Mexico, income and European appearance are strongly positively correlated. Racist attitudes, 
overt preference for the European appearance and high unemployment combine to maintain this 
racial economic hierarchy. Free market policies could help to reduce the racial economic 
inequality. These policies, however, go against the economic interests of the wealthy white 
oligarchy and against the prevailing political ideology of the dark skinned lower classes. Thus, the 
current racial economic inequality, with its negative economic consequences, is likely to continue.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ndividuals of mixed European and Indian background, the Mestizos, represent 60% of the population. 
The rest of the population is 30% Indian, 9% white and 1% other (Central Intelligence Agency, 2006)
1
. 
Income and wealth are distributed very unequally among these racial groups. The oligarchy is exclusively 
white, and whites are the vast majority in the wealthy social class immediately below it. Next in the economic 
hierarchy are the Mestizos. Within the Mestizos, however, there is a discernable economic pecking order, with those 
of predominantly European features, especially light skin, the white/Mestizos, ahead of those with predominantly 
Indian traces, like dark skin. At the bottom are the Indians, who are the majority in the two poorest deciles (Wagley, 
1994, pp. 1-7; Hall & Patrinos, 2004, pp.4-7; Stavenhagem, 1994, p.331; Nevaer, 1995, p.102 ). That is, there is a 
strong positive correlation between European appearance and income in Mexican society. 
 
The attitudes of Mexicans towards this racial economic hierarchy are varied. Some are oblivious to it, some 
deny its existence, some see it as a result of rigid social classes, and some consider it a remnant of the social and 
economic structures of pre-revolutionary Mexico. Most Mexicans, however, are firmly convinced that racism or any 
sort of racial preferences are not the cause of this racial economic hierarchy.  This conviction would be easy to 
accept if it were not for one noticeable social fact, namely: the overt preference for the European appearance across 
society. In this paper it is argued that this preference, when combined with high unemployment, affects the 
distribution of income.  
 
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. The second section discusses the officially non-
existent, albeit very easy to observe, racist attitudes that prevail among whites and white/Mestizos and the 
consequent overt preference for the European appearance across Mexican society. In the third section it is argued 
that the persistent high unemployment allows employers to be economically efficient when they consider their 
preference for the European appearance in their promotion and hiring decisions.  The fourth section argues that free 
markets could help reduce the racial income inequality, but that the implementation of the required reforms faces 
stern opposition from the dark skinned and from the white oligarchy. In the fifth section a few key implications of 
the racial hierarchy for foreign executives working in Mexico are very briefly described. The sixth section contains 
conclusions.  
 
 
 
I 
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RESILIENT RACIST ATTITUDES AND THE PREFERRED RACIAL APPEARANCE  
 
Virulent and hateful racial animosity is non-existent in Mexico. For this reason, most Mexicans are quite 
convinced that their society is free of any form of racial prejudices. Despite this widespread belief, racist attitudes 
have been firmly held by many whites and white/Mestizos for as long as the country has existed. 
 
From the time of the Independence (1821) to the beginning of the Diaz regime (1876), whites openly 
expressed their conviction that they were racially superior to the Indian and the Mestizo.  The ascendancy of Benito 
Juarez to the presidency, Mexico’s only Indian president, during the 1860s did not create social or economic 
conditions that would have induced the white minority to abandon their feelings of racial superiority (Stavenhagen, 
1994, pp. 332-335). During the Diaz regime (1876-1910), the government and the oligarchy, which was entirely 
white, openly accepted the ideology postulating that dark-skinned people were naturally inferior and that only the 
white man was capable of developing a nation (Herring, 1968, p.328; Knight, 1990, p. 78).    
 
 During the 71 years (1929-2000) that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, the PRI, controlled Mexican 
politics, government officials never made public statements about the racial issues that Mexican society faced. The 
PRI governments, however, glorified the Indian past in the country’s official history and enthusiastically embraced 
the ideology of the Cosmic Race developed by Jose Vasconcelos, Mexico’s leading intellectual of the 1930s.  The 
Cosmic Race, as Vasconcelos called the Mestizo race, was inherently superior due to its mixed cultural and racial 
heritage (Knight, 1990, pp. 85-100; Stavenhagen, 1994, pp.335-336).    
 
The glorification of the Indian past, the adoption of the Cosmic Race ideology and the economic progress 
that has been achieved since 1929, have not eliminated the racist attitudes of whites and white/Mestizos. In a study 
done by the OECD at the end of the 1960s, Mexico’s leading entrepreneurs, all of whom were of exclusive 
European ancestry, very openly expressed their firm conviction that Indians and Mestizos were racially inferior 
(Derossi, 1971, pp.136-149). Twenty five years later, in the early and mid 1990s, the pervasive presence of racist 
attitudes among whites and white/Mestizos was reported again in books and articles published as a result of the 
implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the NAFTA (Nevaer, 1995, pp. 101-103). More 
recently, in 2005, Carlos Monsivais, one of Mexico’s most respected intellectuals, published an essay dealing with 
the issue of race in Mexico. Monsivais’ arguments indicate that, although adamantly denied by Mexican society, the 
conviction that Indians and Mestizos are racially inferior continues to be firmly held by the vast majority of whites 
and white/Mestizos (Monsivais, 2005). 
 
Most Mexicans also adamantly deny that there is a preferred racial appearance in their society. This denial, 
however, does not agree with what can clearly be seen in printed ads, T.V. commercials and ads in the internet. In 
these publicity channels, the great majority of the models have European appearance, very few have Mestizo 
appearance and none have Indian appearance
2
. Given the current and historical income distribution, the use of 
models of European appearance would be expected in the publicity of luxurious, sophisticated and very expensive 
goods and services. However, the products and services advertised through these publicity channels include basic 
processed foods, cigarettes, beer, diapers, soft drinks, working class hotels in Mexican resorts and many other 
products and services whose main buyers are dark skinned consumers. Even in the publicity CDs of exclusive 
residential developments, like one called Lagos del Sol in the Riviera Maya, the models hired to represent the brick 
layers building the houses are of European appearance, despite the fact that brick layers in Mexico are Indians and 
Mestizos of dominant Indian appearance.  
 
According to marketers, the use of models of European appearance to advertise the vast majority of 
products and services is done because Indians and Mestizos prefer the European appearance over their own, not 
because they consider themselves racially inferior
3
. So, across Mexican society, either as a result of racist attitudes 
and/or as a result of considering the European appearance to be more attractive than other racial appearances, there 
is an overt preference for the European appearance, notwithstanding that this is not the appearance of the majority of 
the population.  
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THE EMPLOYERS’ PREFERRED RACIAL APPEARANCE 
 
The mere existence of this preference is not, however, sufficient to link it to the observed racial economic 
hierarchy. For this link to exist, the preference for the European appearance must play a systematic role in decisions 
that affect individual incomes. Among the most important decisions of this type, if not the most important, are those 
regarding the hiring and promotion of personnel.   
 
Basic microeconomic theory shows, however, that these decisions should not be influenced by racial 
appearances or by any other non-job related characteristics of the employees; for hires and promotions should be 
based solely upon the skills of the applicants and the requirements of the job (Landsburg, 2002, pp. 556-557). This 
reasoning, although theoretically valid, ignores three important features of the Mexican economy, namely: limited to 
non-existent competition in many consumer markets; persistent double digit rates of unemployment in blue collar 
and white collar labor markets; and practical absence of highly sophisticated jobs that require Ph.Ds in science and 
engineering (Teichman, 2004, pp. 212-213 ; UNAM, 2007;  INEGI, 2007). 
 
The limited to non-existent competition in consumer markets allows producers to obtain profits even if they 
are economically inefficient; whereas the other two features assure employers of consistently having more than 
enough qualified applicants for the vast majority of job openings. Hence, when deciding whom to promote or whom 
to hire, employers have been in the position of considering, if they wished, non-job related attributes of the 
candidates, like racial appearance. Employers who consider the racial appearance of applicants in the selection and 
promotion of personnel are just introducing their personal preferences in this kind of decisions. This is, as argued 
below, a utility maximizing behavior.  
 
Employers, it can be realistically assumed, derive utility from the daily interaction with their personnel. 
Among the factors that contribute to this interaction are the skills, personality, temperament, age, experience and 
racial appearance of the employees. Therefore, employers trying to maximize the utility that they derive from this 
interaction, must consider these and other factors in their promotion and hiring decisions. To determine if this 
maximization affects the selection of candidates of different racial appearances, a typical utility function will be 
borrowed from consumer theory. To keep, however, the analysis as simple as possible, the only factors that will be 
considered in this utility function are skills, racial appearance and wage. So, the proposed utility function is:  
 
U = S
α
 R
β 
 W
-1 
(1) 
 
where U is the utility the employer derives from the interaction with a given employee, S and R are respectively, 
units of skills and European racial appearance, and W is the wage for the job.  
 
The minimum value of S and R is assumed to be one. This happens when the employee has the basic skills 
needed for the job and has no European features at all, i.e., when the employee is an Indian who has the skills that 
meet the job requirements. W’s exponent is minus one because the lower the salary or wage to pay, the more utility 
the employer obtains; whereas the values of α and β are determined by the importance that skills and racial 
appearance have for each employer. These values, however, are assumed to be limited by the condition that α + β =1, 
so the utility the employer derives, separately, from skills and European appearance increases at a decreasing rate.  
 
Four hypothetical scenarios will be discussed next. In all of them it will be assumed that an employer with 
preferences represented by (1) and with a job to fill, has a pool of applicants whose racial appearances go from 
Indian and Indian/Mestizo, to individuals of complete European appearance. This assumption limits the applicability 
of the scenarios to discuss to white collar jobs, which include jobs for university graduates, and to the most qualified 
blue collar jobs.  This limitation does not invalidate the analysis, since it is precisely in the socioeconomic classes 
formed by the occupants of these types of jobs that the racial economic hierarchy is easily observable. A second 
assumption for the four scenarios to discuss is that for all job openings there is an excessive supply of qualified 
applicants; that is, for all job openings there are many candidates whose S is equal to or greater than one. This 
assumption is based upon the above mentioned combination of chronically large unemployment and very limited 
number of job openings requiring advanced degrees in science and engineering.  
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In the four scenarios to discuss the objective is to deduce the hypothetical circumstances regarding wage, 
racial appearance and skills that would induce an employer to select a dark skinned applicant over a white applicant. 
In the four scenarios, W* will denote the salary for the job to fill that would be paid in labor markets where 
unemployment is minimal, i.e., the maximum salary that employers would be willing to pay when labor surpluses 
are minimal. In the four scenarios UE and UD will denote the utility the employer would derive from interacting, 
respectively, with the top white applicant and the top dark-skinned applicant. Thus, SE and RE are the units of skills 
and European racial appearance that form UE; while SD and RD are the units of skills and European racial appearance 
that generate UD. In the four scenarios it is consider that RE > RD.  
 
The employer, in the first scenario, faces the following conditions: all applicants have the same level of 
skills, so SE = SD; and the wage is fixed at W*, thus economic efficiency regarding the wage to pay to the selected 
candidate is assured. In this scenario, selecting the applicant who has the higher R, the most European looking 
applicant, is the option that maximizes the employer’s utility.  
 
This scenario is a simplification of the very rare situations when the applicants are homogeneous in terms 
of their skills and the salary, despite the excessive number of applicants, is downwardly inflexible. Nonetheless, it 
shows that under these conditions, Indian and Indian/Mestizo applicants are not going to be hired or promoted as 
long as there are applicants whose appearance is fully or partially European because the fact that RE > RD causes 
UE > UD.  
 
In a second scenario the wage is also set equal to W*, while S varies among the candidates. Under these 
conditions selecting a dark skinned applicant happens if UE < UD. For this to happen, however, it is necessary that SE 
< SD, given that RE > RD and that the salary is the same for all candidates. Hence, for a dark skinned individual to be 
selected, she/he has to be more skilled than the most qualified white applicant.  
 
In a third scenario SE = SD, and as before, RE > RD. However, due to the excessive number of applicants, it 
is assumed that the employer has the power to set the wage for the job, W, below the W*, defined above as the 
salary for the job to fill that would be paid in labor markets where unemployment is minimal. Under these 
circumstances, the selection of a dark skinned applicant happens if the dark skinned applicant accepts a lower salary 
than the salary accepted by the most qualified white applicant. That is, under the circumstances assumed in this 
scenario, and defining WD ad WE as the wages for the most qualified dark skinned and white applicants,  the 
employer the dark-skinned applicant would be selected if the condition WD < WE ≤ W* prevails. 
 
What these arguments indicate is that when the most qualified white and dark skinned candidates have the 
same skills and the wage is downwardly flexible, the dark skinned candidate can be given the job if she/he agrees to 
work for less than the white candidate. By doing this the dark skinned candidate gives a financial reward to the 
employer and undervalues her/his skills. 
 
The fourth, and last, scenario assumes: RE > RD as in previous scenarios, SE < SD and a downwardly 
flexible salary, that is, a salary that may be less than W*. Under these conditions the dark skinned candidate could 
be selected without having to accept a lower salary than the most qualified white candidate, if the superiority of 
her/his skills are enough to generate the result UE < UD.  This outcome, although possible, is very unlikely in labor 
markets where jobs requiring very high skill levels, like Ph.Ds in engineering and the sciences, are very few.  So for 
the great majority of jobs the fact that SE < SD would not be enough to cause UE < UD. Hence, like in scenario three, 
in scenario four the dark skinned candidate can be given the job if the condition WD < WE ≤ W* prevails. 
 
These scenarios are, of course, theoretical. However, they show the outcomes that dark skinned job seekers 
face when they compete with applicants who are white or white/Mestizos in labor markets where large labor 
surpluses are permanent and where employers have an overt preference for the European appearance. These 
outcomes go from staying unemployed, which is what the first scenario describes, to accepting jobs for which they 
are overqualified and/or underpaid. In all of these scenarios employers are economically efficient, since in all of 
these employers maximize the utility that they derive from the interaction with their employees without having to 
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employ under qualified personnel. This, however, does not mean that allowing the overt preference for European 
appearance to influence hires and promotions is, from an economic development perspective, harmless.  
 
HAMPERING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
The economic inefficiencies generated by allowing racial appearance to influence hires and promotions are 
the result of the wage differentials explained in scenarios three and four discussed above. As can be recalled, in 
these scenarios W* represents the salary for the job to fill that would be paid in labor markets where unemployment 
is minimal, while WD and WE represent the wage for the most qualified dark-skinned and white applicants. In both 
scenarios a dark-skinned candidate who is at least as qualified as the most qualified white candidate, could be 
selected if the inequality WD < WE ≤ W* prevailed. The first part of this inequality: WE ≤ W*, is attributable to 
persistent large unemployment; whereas the second part: WD < WE, is attributable to the overt preference for the 
European appearance.  This part of the wage differential, entirely caused by racial appearance, aggravates Mexico’s 
notoriously biased income distribution in favor of employers and, as argued next, hinders the progress of higher 
education. 
 
Currently in Mexico, the progress of higher education is the responsibility, to a large extent, of the 
expensive private universities. These are the universities where tuition is no less than $3,000 per semester
4
. From the 
perspective of economic development, these private universities have this responsibility because they are educating 
the future professionals of the upper classes, and because state universities are under severe political pressure to 
increase enrollment thereby lowering academic standards (Lopez Obrador 2006). Mexico’s expensive private 
universities have, however, no incentive to fulfill this responsibility.  
 
The absence of this incentive is the result of the fact that graduates of private expensive universities earn 
more than graduates of state or pubic universities. This wage differential tells expensive private universities that, 
according to the labor markets, they are doing a better job than the state universities; and therefore, that there is no 
reason to improve the quality of the education that they deliver. This reasoning is, however, incongruent with two 
well known characteristics of these universities: the total neglect of research and the formation of teaching staffs 
with adjunct professors who normally lack advanced degrees and have full time employment outside of academia. 
Hence, the assumed academic superiority of the private universities cannot be the reason why graduates of private 
universities earn more than their counterparts from state universities.  
 
To find this explanation is enough to look at the racial composition of the student populations. In expensive 
private universities whites, white/Mestizos and Mestizos who strongly identify with the white segment of society 
form the majority of the student population; while in state universities, the great majority of the student population is 
dark-skinned. Given this racial composition and the overt preference for the European appearance in labor markets, 
it follows that the graduates of expensive private universities will earn more than the graduates of state universities. 
Thus as long as this combination is allowed to create a wage differential in favor of the graduates of expensive 
private universities,  the expensive private universities  will keep doing what are they are doing, i.e., delivering an 
education of mediocre quality
5
.     
 
 
TRUE FREE MARKETS: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION OPPOSED BY THE DARK-SKINNED AND THE 
WEALTHY WHITE.   
 
For the deeply entrenched preference for the European appearance among employers to disappear, 
employers need a very strong motivation to exclusively consider, albeit reluctantly, the skills of the applicants in 
hiring and promotion decisions. This need can only materialize in markets where competition is intense. According 
to the OECD, this could happen by implementing legal reforms that actually promote free markets in all sectors of 
the economy. These reforms, also according to the OECD, have the potential of attracting foreign investment and 
generating sustained rates of growth of 4% or more per year, which is what Mexico needs to markedly ameliorate its 
unemployment problem (OECD, 2005, p. 9). 
 
Journal of Diversity Management – Third Quarter 2008 Volume 3, Number 3 
 24 
Regarding labor, these reforms consist in reducing the excessive protection that current labor laws give to 
workers and employees. These laws make it very expensive to hire and fire labor, thereby restricting the growth of 
the demand for labor. Regarding business, the reforms recommended by the OECD would reduce the current 
excessive level of regulations of consumer markets, simplify the cumbersome and expensive bureaucratic 
procedures for opening new businesses, and remove the concessions that, de facto, have created monopolies and 
oligopolies in the following sectors: banking, cement, energy, retail, steel, telecommunications, television, tortilla 
and transportation (OECD, 2005, pp.9-12). These reforms, regardless of the economic benefits that they may 
generate for the entire society, are not likely to be implemented in the near future.  
 
For the dark-skinned majorities the free market policies and reforms implemented in the last eighteen years 
have brought some benefits to the consumer. But, from their perspective, these policies and reforms have also had 
the following costs: lower salaries, reduced access to higher education, more expensive housing and transportation, 
and an increased dependency on foreign capital. For the dark-skinned majorities there is no doubt that the costs of 
these policies have been larger than the benefits (Lopez Obrador, 2006).Additionally, for the political leaders of the 
dark skinned majorities accepting the implementation of more free market policies would be an ideological defeat. 
Hence, regardless of what actual economic benefits the adoption of free market policies have generated, and could 
generate,  for the poor and working classes, the dark skinned majorities oppose and will continue to oppose the 
implementation of most legal reforms aimed at promoting free markets. 
 
The wealthy white oligarchy has benefited greatly from the free market policies that have been 
implemented in the last fifteen years (Chong and Lopez-de- Silanes, 2003, pp.22-27). The wealthy white oligarchy, 
furthermore, has no ideological quarrel with these policies and is fully convinced that true free market policies and 
reforms will generate faster economic growth, larger markets, and economic efficiency. This favorable view of free 
markets is, however, quite incongruent with the fact that after eighteen or more years of free market policies and 
four pro business administrations, consumer and resource markets continue to be dominated by oligopolies and 
monopolies (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005, p.1). This incongruence finds explanations in the behavior of 
the leadership of Mexico’s private sector when important free market reforms or policies were going to be 
implemented. In 1980 when the government proposed joining the GATT, the private sector defeated this proposition. 
In the early nineties, the private sector accepted the NAFTA after making sure that many of its privileges were kept 
and after coming to the conclusion that this treaty was the best option for avoiding an economic collapse like the one 
experienced in 1982-1983 (Tornell, 1995, pp.53-54). Later during the Fox administration (2000-2006), the 
leadership of the private sector defeated initiatives to put some transparency in the stock market and to open the 
television and telephone sectors (O’Grady, 2006; Heritage Foundation, 2006, p.1). This behavior indicates that the 
private sector only supports those free markets reforms and policies that do not diminish their monopolistic or 
oligopolistic privileges. So, the private sector may support the OECD’s recommendations regarding labor; but there 
is no reason to expect that the private sector will support the OECD’s recommendations dealing with the reforms 
needed to promote competition in resource and consumer markets. 
 
It is, therefore, up to the economic authorities of the federal government to convince Mexico’s Congress to 
adopt the reforms recommended by the OECD. These authorities began to lobby Mexico’s Congress to adopt free 
markets policies and reforms in the early nineties. But as mentioned above, eighteen years and four pro-business 
administrations later, consumer and resource markets continue to be dominated by monopolies and oligopolies. 
Given this record, it is unrealistic to expect that the economic authorities will be able to convince Mexico’s 
Congress, in the near future, of the need to adopt reforms and policies that truly promote free markets. Hence, it is 
also unrealistic to expect that, in the near future, the overt preference for the European appearance will stop 
influencing hiring and promotion decisions.  
 
A FEW IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN EXECUTIVES. 
 
A detailed discussion of the business implications that the overt preference for the European appearance 
has for foreign executives working in Mexico is beyond the scope of this paper. However, three of these 
implications will be briefly described.  
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Foreign executives transferred to Mexico, but who have little or no experience in Mexico, may assume that 
in the formation of their staffs all that should matter are the professional skills of the members of this staff. 
Nonetheless, if this staff deals with representatives of Mexico’s oligarchy, then this staff must include, in the most 
visible positions, individuals who are white or white/Mestizos. Otherwise, the social prestige of this executive will 
suffer.  
 
The second implication has to do with the academic quality of universities and the hiring of engineers and 
other professionals. Foreign executives will hear from members of Mexico’s upper classes that the expensive private 
universities are quite superior to the state universities. Foreign executives will also notice that the graduates of 
expensive private universities tend to ask for higher salaries than the graduates of state universities.   Yet, as 
mentioned above, the education delivered by the expensive universities tends to be of mediocre quality. Thus, when 
hiring engineers and other professionals, foreign executives would make a mistake if they equate the quality of the 
academic background of the candidates with the salaries that they are asking. 
 
Finally, the third implication deals with the treatment of the labor force, especially blue collar workers. 
Foreign executives will run across examples of Mexican employers who badly mistreat their labor forces. In those 
occasions when the Mexican employer is of exclusive European origin, the mistreatment may have racial overtones. 
Mexican employers who do this have the government connections that allow them to get away with this offense and, 
of much importance, neither government officials nor the unions would see racial reasons behind any mistreatment 
of the labor force. But if a foreign employer does it, the racial issue is likely to appear. This will increase the cost 
and the complexity of any labor dispute. So, foreign executives should not follow the examples of mistreatment of 
the labor force that they will certainly observe in some Mexican employers.     
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
A common explanation for the existence of the racial economic hierarchy, among Mexicans who recognize 
its existence, is that such a hierarchy is a simple remnant of pre-revolutionary Mexican society. This explanation is 
invalidated by two easily observable facts: the existence of firm racist attitudes among whites and white/Mestizos, 
and the overt preference for the European appearance across society.    
 
 This overt preference influences income distribution because employers derive utility from the interaction 
with their employees, and racial appearance is one of the factors that are part of this interaction.  Employers can 
consider this, non-job related factor in their personnel decisions, because the persistent large labor surpluses assure 
them of an excessive supply of qualified candidates for most positions. 
 
Despite contribution to the utility that employers derive from the interaction with their personnel, the overt 
preference for the European appearance is detrimental to the process of economic development for at least two 
reasons.  First, this preference aggravates Mexico’s notoriously biased income distribution; and second, it gives 
expensive private universities an incentive to maintain their current low academic standards.  
 
 To be able to implement the reforms needed to eliminate, or at least to diminish, the influence of the 
preference for the European appearance in hiring and promotion decisions, Mexico’s government has to accomplish 
two very difficult tasks. It has to convince the dark-skinned that free markets will improve their economic lot; and it 
has to defeat the lobbying of the white oligarchy against the adoption of reforms that remove their economic 
privileges. Given the poor record that the government has had in both tasks, there is no reason to expect that the 
needed reforms will be adopted any time soon. 
 
END NOTES 
 
1 Many Mexicans would not agree with this racial classification. However, the CIA’s classification is consistent with the racial 
classification reported in the 1930 Census, which was the last census when the authorities made an effort to determine the racial 
composition of Mexican society. 
2 The only T.V. adds where Indians and dark-skinned Mestizos appear are those of  political nature and those that promote 
hygiene or civil behavior in public places. 
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3 This is the opinion of two professors of marketing of the Universidad de las Americas-Puebla interviewed in 2003. One of these 
professors has a Ph. D. in marketing from Texas A&M University and was, until 2005, dean of the Business School of this 
university. 
4 There are more than 200 private universities in Mexico, but only about 20 of them charge a  tuition  of $3,000 or more per 
semester. The largest of these expensive universities is the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, which 
has an enrollment of close to 90,000 students in its 35 campuses.  The most elitist is, perhaps, the Universidad Anáhuac and the 
most expensive is the Universidad de las Americas-Puebla where the tuition approaches $4,000 per semester. 
5 A notable exception is the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de Mexico, the ITAM. This institution delivers an excellent 
education in the area of economics and in other areas related to business. In this institution a good number of the professors are 
full time and many of them have advanced degrees from very prestigious American and European universities 
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